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This paper investigates the role of guilt aversion for corruption in public administration. 
Corruption is modeled as the outcome of a game played between a bureaucrat, a lobby, and 
the public. There is a moral cost of corruption for the bureaucrat, who is averse to letting the 
public down. We study how the behavior of the lobby and the bureaucrat depend on perceived 
public beliefs, when these are constant and when they are allowed to vary over time. With 
time-varying beliefs, corruption is more likely when the horizon of the game is relatively long 
and when public beliefs are initially low and are updated fast. 
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The economic literature on corruption typically assumes that government officials rationally 
weigh their expected monetary costs and benefits from corruption, and accordingly decide 
whether to behave corruptly or not. Moreover, the principal-agent framework is typically used 
for a structural analysis of corruption (see, for example, Becker and Stigler, 1974; Rose-
Ackerman, 1975, 1978; Klitgaard, 1988, 1991; Shleifer and Vishny, 1993; Acemoglu and 
Verdier, 2000). The resulting implications for policymakers are that corrupt behavior can be 
curbed by designing appropriate incentive schemes, which increase the costs of corruption for 
government officials (penalties, effective monitoring), reduce its benefits (limits to the 
discretionary power of officials), or increase the benefits of honest behavior (efficiency 
wages, outcome-contingent contracts).
1
  In this paper we focus on a different factor that can affect corrupt behavior. We study 
the role of emotions for corruption in public administration and suggest that corruption may 
depend on the beliefs of the public in the context of a repeated psychological game. 
Psychological games (see Geanakoplos et al., 1989; Battigalli and Dufwenberg, 2009) 
incorporate emotions in the motivation of players by including in their utility not only 
material payoffs, but also higher-order beliefs. The inclusion of beliefs in utility can lead to 
emotions such as guilt, embarrassment, disappointment, anger, surprise, or gratitude. In our 
model we consider guilt aversion as a driving factor for the behavior of bureaucrats, and in 
order to do this we extend their utility function beyond monetary costs and rewards and 
include in it the psychological cost of guilt that arises from corrupt behavior. This idea is 
already mentioned in Klitgaard (1991), who argues that raising the “moral costs” of 
corruption can be one of five broad sets of tools to control corruption. These “moral costs” of 
corruption refer mainly to organizational cultures and codes of ethics, something that is 
applicable to bureaucracies.
2
  Guilt aversion is defined in Charness and Dufwenberg (2006) as the emotion that 
arises when a player “believes he hurts others relative to what they believe they will get”. 
Further theoretical models on guilt include Dufwenberg (2002), Battigalli and Dufwenberg 
(2007), while experimental evidence on the effect of guilt on decision-making is abundant 
(see, for instance, Dufwenberg and Gneezy, 2000; Guerra and Zizzo, 2004; Charness and 
Dufwenberg, 2006; Dufwenberg et al., 2006; Bacharach et al., 2007; Battigalli and 
                                                 
1 On the question of which factors can help reduce the level of corruption, see also Mookherjee and Png (1995), 
Margit and Shi (1998), Waller et al. (2002). 
2 See also van Winden (2007:57) for a discussion on the importance of incorporating emotions in the domain of 
public choice: “In my view, by now sufficient evidence exists to replace homo economicus by homo sapiens, a 
boundedly rational and emotional agent, in the private sector as well as the public sector.” 
  2Dufwenberg, 2007; Reuben et al., 2009). Corazzini et al. (2007) offer experimental evidence 
in support of the hypothesis that politicians are motivated by guilt aversion from letting the 
electorate down. Although their setting is based on electoral competition, the results are 
important for us because they link the behavior of politicians to their beliefs about the 
expectations of the electorate, and therefore strengthen the case for a model that adds guilt 
aversion to the study of corruption in the domain of public administration. 
Our stylized model of corruption in public administration shows that, when the 
bureaucrat is averse to letting the public down, corruption is less likely to emerge in 
equilibrium compared to a version of the game without psychological payoffs. The model 
predicts that -under certain assumptions- corruption can lead to more corruption, if the self-
fulfilling beliefs of the public enter a downward trajectory. Whether or not a society becomes 
entrapped in such a corruption spiral depends on a number of factors: corruption is more 
likely when the psychological component in the bureaucrat’s utility is strong relative to the 
monetary incentives (i.e., when he is very guilt averse), when public beliefs are initially low 
and are updated fast, and when the expected horizon of the game is relatively long. 
In broader terms, the paper adds to the literature that studies the role of beliefs and 
emotions in decision-making, by considering the impact of an inactive third party on a 
cooperation game played between two other players, under the assumption of guilt aversion. 
The model takes a close look at the dynamic properties of beliefs and at how these affect the 
outcome of the game. Beliefs are initially constrained to be constant over time. We then relax 
this assumption and move to a version of the model in which players update their beliefs. In 
such a setting, players must take into account the effect of their actions on others’ beliefs in 
the future; this introduces an additional element of strategic behaviour.  
In another application of psychological game theory to the field of public 
administration and corruption, Huang and Wu (1994) look at a psychological game of trust,  
where a player’s remorse from betraying another player’s trust is proportional to their 
expectations. The central insight of Huang and Wu (1994) is that the expectation-dependent 
moral cost of betrayal leads to a multiplicity of equilibria, some of which feature (at least 
some degree of) honest behavior. The authors use corruption in bureaucratic organizations as 
their central example: bureaucrats may act less corruptly if they believe that the public has 
high expectations of them. Then, different equilibria with their corresponding sets of beliefs 
can be viewed as alternative social norms. Compared to Huang and Wu (1994), we 
endogenize the benefit from corruption by introducing a bribe-paying lobby. Moreover, as the 
bribe can vary over time, so can the moral cost of corruption. Another paper assuming that 
  3bureaucrats are averse to letting the public down is Varoufakis (2006), who studies the 
evolution of corruption in bureaucracies with the added twist of linking it to political 
participation. 
  
2. A model of corruption in public administration 
2.1. Players, structure and beliefs 
Consider the following three-person game. Player A is a bureaucrat, player B is (some 
representative of) a business or lobby, and player C is the public.
3 The lobby can bribe the 
bureaucrat with the purpose of eliciting some favor from him (e.g., a procurement contract 
with favorable terms), which amounts to corruption. If the bribe is high enough, the lobby 
may be able to persuade the bureaucrat to act corruptly, which however generates a negative 
externality for the public. Consistent with the widely used definition of corruption as the 
“misuse of public office for private gain” (Rose-Ackerman, 1999), the bureaucrat can thus 
choose an action that hurts the public but ensures a higher payoff for him. 
To formalize these ideas, let there be two distinct sets of monetary payoffs, called the 
high and the low set,  { L H, = } Π , with H=(aH, bH, cH) and L=(aL, bL, cL), where a, b and c are 
the payoffs of players A, B and C respectively. Player A determines the outcome of the game 
by choosing either H or L. Payoffs are such that aL<aH, cL<cH, bL>bH, aH-aL<bL-bH, 
aH+bH+cH > aL+bL+cL. Hence, H gives a relatively high payoff to players A and C, whereas 
L is more favorable than H to player B but at the same time lowers total welfare.   
  Before A makes his choice, B has the option of making a transfer to him, which can be 
understood as a bribe paid to the bureaucrat in order to convince him to choose the payoff set 
L. Let k be the value of this transfer,  . The term corruption refers to the situation in 
which players A and B cooperate in order to increase both their payoffs at the expense of 
player C. Thus, corruption means that B pays a bribe of 
0 ≥ k
] , [ H L L H b b a a k − − ∈ and A chooses 
the low payoff set L. The condition aH-aL<bL-bH ensures that there are mutual gains from 
corruption for A and B. The non-corrupt outcome occurs when A chooses the high payoff 
set.
4  
  Beliefs are defined as follows. Let p denote the probability that A will choose H, and 
let π denote C’s expectation of p. Finally, q is A’s expectation of C’s expectation of p, in other 
words his second order belief. In brief, p=Pr(H), π=E
C(p), q=E
A(π). Player B’s expectation of 
                                                 
3 I intentionally refer to a bureaucrat and not a politician. The latter is elected and therefore the public is far from 
being an inactive player. Bureaucrats, on the other hand, are appointed and their positions are often permanent 
(although it is true that their careers can depend on political affiliations). 
4 Player A could in theory choose L even if the bribe is lower than (aH-aL). This situation is not defined as 
corruption here, since it reduces A’s payoff. 
  4π equals that of player A, i.e., it equals q.
5 Unless otherwise stated, the term “beliefs” will 
refer throughout the paper to the bureaucrat’s second order belief q. 
  The utility functions of players B and C comprise simply their monetary payoffs. As 
explained in the introduction, the central assumption of the model is that player A is guilt 
averse, i.e., he is averse to letting player C down. This is modeled as follows. If A chooses L, 
his utility includes the monetary payoff and the bribe (if any), but also a psychological cost 
from betraying C’s expectations (see Figure 1). In other words, there is an endogenous benefit 
to corruption (equal to the bribe), and a dual cost to it. The bureaucrat may have to exert some 
effort in order to grant the favor or in order to preserve secrecy and avoid getting caught -this 
cost corresponds to the difference aH-aL. Alternatively, this difference can be thought of as the 
expected cost from being caught (probability of detection multiplied by the penalty). In 
addition to this direct cost, the bureaucrat suffers a moral cost of corruption. This is equal to 
γq, where the parameter γ measures the intensity of guilt aversion. The value of γ is common 
knowledge.
6 The model conditions guilt only on the beliefs of the public, and not on those of 
the lobby. Section 4 relaxes this assumption and looks at the implications of allowing the 
bureaucrat to feel guilt when he lets any of the two players down. 
 







  Under our assumption of guilt aversion, the bureaucrat is not a purely selfish money-
maximizer and his motivation includes the fact that he feels he must live up to the 
expectations of the public. This sense of duty and responsibility is stronger, the higher the 
public’s expectations. Consider a bureaucrat who acts corruptly. The term (-γq) in his utility 
function implies that this bureaucrat will feel less guilt in a society where corruption is widely 
regarded as very likely than in a society that holds high expectations of him.  
 
 
                                                 
5 The assumption that A and B have the same second order beliefs can be relaxed without leading to any  
qualitative changes in the results, but increasing the complexity of the analysis. 
6 On this assumption, see the discussion in section 3.1. 
  52.2. The one-shot solution 
Given the timing of events, backwards induction reveals that no bribe is paid in equilibrium, 
since player B correctly anticipates that A’s dominant strategy is to choose H for every 
possible amount of the bribe. This is a standard commitment problem and corruption cannot 
be sustained in equilibrium. In this example, the psychological assumption regarding the 
bureaucrat’s utility does not affect the outcome. Indeed, guilt aversion pushes him even 
stronger towards choosing H, since the choice of L generates an additional psychological cost. 
However, beliefs can make a difference when the game is indefinitely (even if finitely) 
repeated.  
 
2.3. The repeated game 
Let the above game be played repeatedly and suppose that after every repetition the 
probability that the game will be played once more equals ) 1 , 0 ( ∈ r , where r is constant across 
periods. In this dynamic context, players may be able to establish corruption by adopting 
some conditional collusive strategy. In particular, consider the possibility that B adopts the 
following grim trigger strategy (called SB): “Pay a positive bribe x  in the first period, and 
then only keep paying the same bribe provided A has colluded in the previous period; switch 
permanently to a zero bribe if in any period A does not collude”. Turning to the bureaucrat, 
he may also adopt a trigger strategy of the following sort: “Collude as long as B has paid at 
least y, never collude if B pays less than y in any period”.  
B
Given these trigger strategies, an infinite number of equilibria are possible, some of 
which support corruption (those in which y x ≥ ). The problem is that there is no natural way 
of selecting among these equilibria.
7 Although there are infinite intertemporal strategies that 
can be adopted by the players and supported in equilibrium, we shall confine ourselves in 
what follows to certain focal strategies. In particular, the analysis will focus here on the case 
where B plays SB and A plays the following simple strategy, called S B
                                                
A: “Collude as long as 
the payoff from corruption is at least equal to the payoff from no corruption”. These 
strategies correspond to a situation where the lobby is able to extract the maximum benefit 
from corruption, while keeping the bureaucrat indifferent between corruption and no 
corruption.  Moreover, when public beliefs are updated, these strategies have the interesting 
feature that they generate time-varying bribes, which are functions of those beliefs. In the 
appendix we discuss another extreme case, where strategies are such that the bureaucrat is 
 
7 As Binmore and Shaked (2010:88) point out, “the case of multiple Nash equilibria is hard, because most game 
theorists regard the equilibrium selection problem as unsolved”. 
  6able to extract the maximum possible bribe from the lobby. The choice of these two cases will 
allow us to pin down the respective corruption equilibria with extreme allocations: one where 
the lobby is able to capture the entire surplus from corruption, and one where the bureaucrat 
captures the entire surplus. For the sake of simplicity we will only study these two cases, 
although any intermediate sharing of the surplus is possible in some equilibrium of the 
repeated game.  
Let q, the bureaucrat’s second-order belief, be constant throughout the horizon of the 
game. We also require that q be correct in equilibrium, i.e., that the second-order belief 
correspond to reality. This assumption is necessary in order to use the concept of a 
psychological Nash equilibrium (henceforth PNE, see Geanakoplos et al., 1989) for the 
solution of the game. Both of these assumptions will be relaxed in the next section. 
Player B plays SB and player A plays S B A. As we have seen, this strategy amounts to A 
colluding provided that the bribe covers at least the difference between aH and aL, and it is the 
strategy that gives the lowest collusive payoff to A and the highest collusive payoff to B. 
Given that B plays SB
B each period, and given that none of the parameters change over time, 
she will pay the same bribe k every period if there is corruption. Accordingly, A will either 
collude in every period or he will never collude. The associated respective total expected 
payoffs for A are: ) 1 ( ) ( r q k aL − − + γ ,  ) 1 /( r a k H − + . If A honours B’s trust and colludes, 
then each period his utility equals the low monetary payoff aL plus the bribe minus the cost 
from guilt. If he chooses not to collude, then his utility is high in the first period, but in all 
subsequent periods he receives only aH. Comparing the two payoffs, it follows that player A 
will collude as long as:  .                (1)  k q a a r L H / ] ) [( γ + − ≥
This expression conditions the sustainability of corruption on the effect of guilt (γq), 
the monetary loss that player A suffers if he chooses L (aH-aL), the expected duration of the 
interaction and the amount of the bribe. For A to collude, the bribe and the expected horizon 
of the game must be sufficiently high with respect to the difference in monetary payoffs and 
to the psychological cost of disappointing the public. 
 
Lemma 1 
Given SA and SB, if corruption is the equilibrium of the game B pays the following bribe k  
every period:   
B
*
r q a a k L H / ) ( * γ + − =
This follows from (1).  
 
  7A bribe of k
* compensates A for the utility loss caused by the lower monetary payoff 
and the cost of guilt. A high continuation probability r reduces the amount of the bribe. This 
accounts for the fact that the bribe is paid in advance, so that in any given period T the benefit 
to A from corruption lies in the future while the cost is borne starting at T. 
 
Proposition 1 
Given that A and B follow strategies SA and SB respectively, the game has two possible equilibria:  B
(i) The corruption equilibrium, with Π=L in every period, p=q=0, and k
*=(aH-aL)/r. 
(ii) The no corruption equilibrium, with Π=H in every period, p=q=1, and k
*=0. 
If  H L L H b b r a a − ≤ + − / ) ( γ , the equilibrium is necessarily (i) 
If  , the equilibrium is necessarily (ii)  H L L H b b r a a − ≥ − / ) (
Otherwise, both equilibria are possible. 
 
Proof:  H L L H b b r a a − ≤ + − / ) ( γ  means that, from (1), B can always pay a bribe high enough (and 
still lower than bL-bH) to sustain corruption, even if perceived expectations are at the highest possible 
level (q=1). Knowing this, the public is convinced that A and B will collude, q is actually zero and A 
confirms these expectations by choosing L. On the other hand,  H L L H b b r a a − ≥ − / ) (  means that, 
from (1), B cannot pay a bribe lower than bL-bH and still high enough to sustain corruption, even if 
q=0. Therefore, everyone expects the no-corruption equilibrium (p=q=1) and expectations are again 
confirmed.  
 
  The above equilibria satisfy the definition of a PNE: players’ strategies are optimal 
and beliefs correspond to actual play. There is a multiplicity (at least within certain parameter 
values), meaning that we could end up in any of the two equilibria.
8 In this repeated game, the 
psychological element in the bureaucrat’s motivation makes corruption less likely to emerge 
in equilibrium. To see this, note that in the absence of guilt aversion (i.e., when γ=0) the 
necessary and sufficient condition for corruption is:  H L L H b b r a a − ≤ − / ) (      (2) 
  This is the solution to the standard, non-psychological version of the game. Comparing 
(2) with the conditions given in Proposition 1 reveals that, for certain parameter values, 
corruption is always the outcome when γ=0 but not necessarily when γ>0. 
  
                                                 
8 Of course, as in any other infinitely repeated game of interest, many other equilibria exist if we consider 
strategies other than SA and SB, inclusive equilibria in mixed strategies (which necessarily involve less 
cooperation than the pure strategy equilibrium characterized in Proposition 1). 
 
  83. Time-varying beliefs 
3.1. General 
So far it has been assumed that beliefs are constant and that they correspond to the 
equilibrium outcome, which is reached in the first period and does not change over the 
horizon of the game. These assumptions are now relaxed and beliefs are allowed to vary over 
time. Before we look at the specifics of the model, we begin with a remark regarding 
equilibrium. The model in this section will posit a specific behavioral assumption regarding 
the evolution of beliefs (in the form of an updating process), generating beliefs that are not 
necessarily correct in equilibrium. This means that the model no longer satisfies the 
assumptions required for the application of PNE or sequential equilibrium (SE) as solution 
concepts.
9 In light of this fact, we will consider a state in which players A and B are in 
equilibrium in their corruption game, but the inactive player C may hold out-of-equilibrium 
beliefs about its outcome.  
  One way to motivate the above ideas is to consider the possibility of asymmetric 
information in the model. It was assumed that all the parameters (payoffs and psychological 
factors) are common knowledge; this assumption appears unrealistic in many settings, 
particularly in the context of psychological games.
10 If player C knows all the parameters of 
the model as well as the strategies that A and B follow, beliefs will jump to a corner and we 
will end up with one of the equilibria described in Proposition 1. If, instead, information is 
incomplete, it seems appropriate to not constrain beliefs to be correct in equilibrium, but to 
allow them to take interior values. For this, it is sufficient to think that C may not know some 
of the parameters of the model (for instance the psychological parameter γ), or that he simply 
does not know the particular strategies SA and SB that the other players follow, which would 
mean that from C’s point of view anything could be an equilibrium of the repeated game.  
B
                                                
On a related issue, the analysis of the game hinges crucially on the assumption that B 
knows how guilt averse A is, and thus, she can pay the appropriate bribe. This is admittedly a 
strong assumption- even though it is common in the literature on psychological games. To 
motivate it, one can think that the lobby invests some resources in order to find out the extent 
to which a given bureaucrat is prone to corruption (e.g., based on his behavior in other 
 
9 Both the SE (Battigalli and Dufwenberg, 2009) and PNE require that beliefs of any order be correct in 
equilibrium. See Battigali and Dufwenberg (2009: 16), for their consistency assumption as well as its analogy to 
PNE. 
10 “Unless one models interaction within a family or amongst friends, it is probably not realistic to assume that 
players know each other’s psychological propensities” (Battigalli and Dufwenberg 2009:27). Also, Rabin (1993) 
motivates the study of psychological games with incomplete information, where a player’s knowledge of other 
players’ motives may be limited. 
  9positions in the past). The public is not organized and able to undertake collective action in a 
similar way as the lobby, and therefore may not know the true value of γ. 
 
3.2. The model with updated beliefs 
Beliefs are initially at some exogenous level q0 and they can change over time (q=qt): the 
public updates its belief about A’s choice each period taking into account A’s choice in the 
preceding period, and players A and B update their perceived beliefs in exactly the same 
way.
11 Before imposing a specific process, we begin with a general case where the only 
assumption is that beliefs fall every time player A chooses L, and that they rise every time he 




> = Π <







t t t t
t t t t
q and L if q q
q and H if q q
       (3) 
 
  Following the discussion in section 3.1, we define an equilibrium of our corruption 
game with updated beliefs as a pair of strategies SA and SB of players A and B, and a belief q B t 
of player C, such that: (i) in every period, SA and SB
B are best responses to each other, and (ii) 
qt is updated according to (3). 
  Proceeding as in section 2, we can determine the amount of the bribe that in every 
period makes player A indifferent between always colluding and never colluding (from that 
period onwards). This is given by:  k
*
t = (aH – aL + γqt)/r       (4) 
 
Proposition 2 
Given (3), SA and SB, the unique optimal sequence of bribe payments made by player B in the 
corruption equilibrium is k
B
                                                
*
t as given by (4). 
 
Proof: In any period T throughout the game, no bribe kT>k
*
T will be paid; since k
*
T is high enough to 
make player A prefer the collusive outcome subject to k
*
t being offered in all subsequent periods, a 
higher bribe unnecessarily reduces B’s payoff. On the other hand, no kT<k
*
T is offered in period T 
either. Such a bribe is lower than what is needed to compensate player A, so the latter will not collude 
in period T with kT<k
*
T , unless he expects to be compensated for the loss in T in some future period(s). 
But such an expectation is not rational and any such commitment by player B would not be credible, 
since we have just seen that kt will never exceed k
*





11 The assumption that A and B have correct second order beliefs is not crucial. All that is required is that A and 
B have the same second order beliefs. See also footnote 5 on this. 
  10Corollary 1 
Given (3), SA and SB, the sequence of optimal bribe payments in the corruption equilibrium is 





+ > t t k k
This follows immediately from (3) and (4). 
  
  This corollary is saying that, in this particular setting, the bribe that the lobby must pay 
falls over time. Hence, corruption becomes cheaper for the lobby each period. The reason why 
this happens is that the bribe must compensate the bureaucrat for the cost of guilt, and this 
cost falls each period as expectations become lower. This result implies that, by lowering 
public expectations and eroding confidence in public administration over time, corruption 
paves the way for more corruption.
12
We will now examine the conditions under which the corruption equilibrium emerges. 
In any period, paying a bribe in exchange for the choice of L is profitable for B if kt<bL-bH, 
i.e., if her cost (bribe) is lower than her benefit. Moreover, from Corollary 1, if this action is 
profitable in the first period, it will be profitable in all subsequent periods. The intuition is that 
expectations fall over time and the required compensation diminishes as guilt becomes 
weaker. This leads to the fact that an equilibrium with corruption in every period is definitely 
profitable for player B if:   H L L H b b r q a a − ≤ + − / ) ( 0 γ      (5) 
This condition ties the emergence of corruption to initial beliefs. But that is not the 
whole story. Condition (5) is sufficient for corruption to be profitable for B, but it is not 
necessary. It may be the case that B wants to sustain corruption even if it is unprofitable for 
her in the first period. The reason is that, as beliefs fall, k
*
t will also fall over time so that the 
total expected return from always paying the bribe may be positive. In other words, player B 
might make a monetary sacrifice today in the expectation that she will be compensated for it 
tomorrow, since the effect of this sacrifice will be to drive expectations down. In order to be 
able to say something about the outcome of the game in that case, we must assume a specific 
dynamic process for beliefs and assess the benefits and costs of setting kt=k
*
t as in (4) 
throughout the horizon of the game. Let beliefs be updated according to the following 
process: 
 
                                                 
12 Another paper in which corruption leads to more corruption is Tirole (1996). In a principal-agent model, 
Tirole (1996) shows how an economy can become “locked” in a high corruption steady state when the 
principal’s source of information about the agent is the agent’s group reputation. 
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1
1
t t t t t
t t t t t
q and L if q q q
q and H if q q q
ρ
ρ
This process specifies that in any given period beliefs will move either upwards, if 
there was no corruption in the previous period, or downwards if there was corruption.
13 The 
parameter  ] 1 , 0 [ ∈ ρ  measures the speed of beliefs adjustment.
14 If ρ =1, beliefs jump to a 
corner after the first period. In the opposite case where ρ=0, beliefs do not move over time 
and remain at their initial value of q0 (as in the previous section). This process captures the 
main features of the adjustment of beliefs that we have in mind, although one can think of 
alternative specifications. 
Solving the difference equations in (6) gives the following expressions for beliefs at 






− − + − =
m equilibriu corruption the in q q
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     (7) 
From (4) and (7), we obtain the level of the bribe in any period t: 
r q a a k
t
L H t / ] ) 1 ( [ 0
* ρ γ − + − =         (8) 
  
Proposition 3 
When beliefs follow the dynamic process given in (6), and given SA and SB, the game has two 
possible equilibria: 
B
(i) If  H L










)] 1 ( 1 [
) 1 ( ) ( 0
ρ
γ
  ,       ( 9 )  
the outcome is corruption in every period with kt=k
*
t as given in (8). 
(ii) If (9) does not hold, corruption never occurs. 
 
Proof:  The corruption equilibrium emerges as long as the expected total value of the bribe payments 
throughout the game does not exceed the expected value of the total benefit of corruption to player B: 













t r b b r k
*
t, because 
to her this is the least costly way of sustaining corruption. On the contrary, if (9) does not hold, player 
B never pays a bribe and player A always chooses H.    
                                                 
13 The first part of the process that refers to the case where there is no corruption does not enter into any of the 
calculations and does not affect the results, because in the no corruption equilibrium the level of beliefs does not 
matter.  
14 In fact, the speeds of upward and downward adjustment should not be constrained to be equal. This would 
account, for example, for the possibility that confidence might take a longer time to build than to destroy. Here 
we use only one parameter ρ for simplicity, since the upward path of beliefs is irrelevant to the outcome of the 
game. 
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3.3. Discussion: Factors that facilitate corruption 
Starting from an initial level of beliefs and observing the incidence -or not- of corruption, the 
public updates its expectations every period. Proposition 3 predicts that, as long as the 
exogenous parameters do not change, corruption will occur either in all periods or in none. It 
therefore also predicts that trust in bureaucrats will keep moving, according to (6), either 
towards very high levels or towards complete disillusionment where everyone expects them to 
act corruptly. If that is the case, lobbies will eventually be able to capture bureaucrats with 
only small amounts of bribes. The intuition for this is that a bureaucrat who knows that the 
public considers him corrupt suffers a low moral cost when he actually behaves in a corrupt 
manner, so that he is eventually caught in a circle of self-fulfilling expectations.  
   Compared to the version of the game with constant beliefs, there is now no 
multiplicity of equilibria and the outcome is determined by (9). This condition reveals that 
corruption is more likely to emerge in equilibrium when:  (i) the stakes of corruption (bL-bH) 
are high and the cost to the bureaucrat (aH-aL) is low,  (ii) guilt aversion is relatively weak 
(low γ), (iii) initial beliefs q0 are low, (iv) the expected horizon of the game is long: as r 
increases, the effect of guilt diminishes relative to the other factors that determine the 
outcome of the game,
15 making corruption less costly for the bureaucrat. In policy terms, this 
means that the frequent rotation of public servants can be an effective instrument against 
corruption, (v) Beliefs are updated fast (high ρ): if the public is quick to become disillusioned 
by a bureaucrat, then the latter is more likely to act corruptly in the first place. On the 
contrary, a bureaucrat is less likely to disappoint the public if beliefs are relatively resilient. 
The intuition behind this result is that, if expectations decline fast following the incidence of 
corruption, then the psychological cost of guilt also diminishes fast and the bribe that is 
required to establish corruption falls. Note, also, that the model predicts that lobbies are likely 
to act strategically and offer very high bribes at initial stages of the corruption relationship, 
with the purpose of marring the image of public officials and making corruption easier and 
cheaper in the future. This strategy is more profitable, the higher is the speed of dynamic 
adjustment of beliefs. 
The last two points (iv) and (v) highlight the fact that allowing beliefs to vary over 
time leads to a time-varying cost of guilt. If the public’s expectations fall during the game, 
then so does the psychological cost to the bureaucrat of betraying these expectations, and vice 
versa. Summing up the main idea of the model, high perceived expectations make corruption 
                                                 
15 This is because qt falls over time, whereas the other parameters remain constant. 
  13harder to sustain because they imply a high guilt-related disutility for the bureaucrat; on the 
contrary, low expectations can actually lead to corruption. This highlights the self-fulfilling 
property of public beliefs in this game.  
 
4. Guilt from letting both players down 
A question that may arise concerning the specification of the game is the following: why does 
the bureaucrat feel guilt only when he lets the public down? In other words, why does he play 
a psychological game with one of the players and a standard (neoclassical) game with the 
other? To motivate this assumption, one may evoke social and psychological arguments. It is 
natural to assume that a bureaucrat has some sense of mission and responsibility towards the 
public that he is supposed to serve, but not towards a lobby. Nevertheless, this section 
modifies the model of section 3.2 by adding guilt from letting the lobby (player B) down. In 
particular, let us assume that, if a positive bribe is paid and player A selects H, he suffers 
guilt. In this context, guilt does not arise from the choice of H per se, but from the fact that A 
fails to respond to B’s trust.
16  
The only difference that this additional psychological assumption makes in the 
analysis of the game is that, if in period t player B pays a bribe and player A selects H, the 
latter’s payoff becomes U
H
t=aH+k-ξμt, where ξ measures the strength of guilt aversion and μt 
is A’s second-order belief, defined in the same way as qt: it is A’s expectation of B’s 
expectation of the probability that A will select L. Note however that, given SB, guilt can only 
occur once, in the first period when A does not collude. This is because in any subsequent 
period B will switch to a zero bribe strategy. Thus, the problem facing the bureaucrat is now 
not the same in every period. If he lets player B down he will have a lower utility in that 
particular period but will afterwards return to the high monetary payoff a
B
H. For simplicity, let 
μt=μ: since beliefs do not matter anymore after A selects H for the first time, there is no need 
for an updating rule similar to (3) or (6). Given SB
B
                                                
 and SA, the optimal sequence of bribes in 
the corruption equilibrium is now: k
*
t = [aH – aL+ γqt – ξμ(1-r)]/r          (10) 
The difference between k
*
t  in (4) and in (10) is the additional term -ξμ(1-r), which 
reduces the level of the bribe that is required to sustain corruption. Compared to the game of 
section 3.2, it is now relatively cheaper for the lobby to influence the bureaucrat, the more so 
the shorter is the horizon of the game. In fact, with the effect of guilt now going in two 
different directions, it is the relative disutility of letting the two players down that matters for 
the outcome of the game. The term (1-r) reflects the fact that guilt from letting B down can 
 
16 If player A suffers guilt whenever he chooses H irrespective of whether a bribe has been paid, the results are 
almost identical to the ones that are obtained here. 
  14only occur once, so that only part of it enters A’s utility seen from any point t in time. Then, 
given (6), the condition for corruption to be the equilibrium outcome becomes: 
H L













− ) 1 (
] ) 1 ( 1 [
) 1 ( ) ( 0 ξμ
ρ
γ
      ( 1 1 )  
In addition to the findings of section 3, we see here that corruption is more likely when 
player B’s perceived beliefs (μ) are high and when A’s guilt from disappointing B is strong 
(high ξ). The effect of the continuation probability r on the incidence of corruption is no 
longer clear-cut, because it works in two opposite directions through the second and third 
term on the left-hand side of (11). 
 
5. Conclusion    
The economic literature on corruption has largely neglected the role of emotions as a driving 
factor for the behavior of actors involved in corrupt activities. In this paper we consider how 
guilt aversion affects the behavior of a bureaucrat, and we do this by modelling corruption in 
public administration as the outcome of a game of collusion between a bureaucrat and a 
lobby, which generates an externality for the public. We have used a stylized model to show 
how guilt aversion can help mitigate the problem of corruption and how it affects the strategic 
behavior of lobbies and the likelihood that they are able to sustain corruption by bribing 
public officials. Some insights regarding the interaction between a bureaucrat, a lobby and the 
public are that declining public expectations allow the lobby to capture the bureaucrat with 
lower bribes; that this paves the way for more and more corruption as public beliefs enter a 
self-fulfilling downward trajectory; finally, that corruption is more likely when public beliefs 
are updated fast and when the interaction between the bureaucrat and the lobby has a long 
expected horizon. 
The analysis of these issues has relied on specific assumptions regarding the 
psychological motivation of the bureaucrat, the updating of public beliefs and the common 
knowledge of certain parameters of the model, and it has concentrated on a focal subset of the 
strategies that players may adopt in the repeated game. In that sense, the paper leaves open 
many possibilities for future research, which could lead to a more general framework for the 
study of this topic. 
  15Appendix: Considering a different set of strategies. 
Consider once more the model of section 3.2. Player A may be able to maximize his payoff 
from corruption through the following trigger strategy, called S
’
A: “Collude as long as the 
bribe is at least equal to y
*=(bL-bH)”. This more aggressive strategy maximizes player A’s 
payoff, provided that player B follows the following simple strategy S’B, which is similar to 
S
B
A: “Pay a bribe high enough to sustain corruption, as long as the payoff from corruption is 
at least equal to the payoff from no corruption”.  
  The value of y
* is such that player B is indifferent between corruption and no 
corruption. Given S
’
A, S’B, and (3), the equilibrium of the game with updated beliefs is the 
following: B pays each period a bribe of k=y and corruption is the equilibrium. B’s total 
expected payoff from corruption is at its possible lowest level and equal to b
B
* 
H/(1-r), while A’s 
expected payoff is equal to (aL+bL-bH-γqt)/(1-r).  
  In this case we do not have a time-varying bribe as in the solution of section 3.2. The 





B. The fall in public beliefs over time leads to an increasing payoff for the bureaucrat given 
that the bribe remains constant, while in section 3.2 it was the lobby that benefitted from the 
fall in beliefs. 
B
  If we consider a wider set of possible strategies by the two players, Corollary 1 on the 
decreasing bribe payments over time will hold as long as the moral cost of corruption for the 
bureaucrat, given by γqt, makes its way into the expression for y (the minimum bribe required 
by the bureaucrat according to his strategy). Of course, given any such set of strategies, 
corruption may or may not be the equilibrium outcome, depending on a number of factors 
captured by an inequality such as (9). 
 
  16References 
 
Acemoglu D., Verdier T., 2000. The choice between market failures and corruption. 
American Economic Review 90: 194-211 
Battigalli P., Dufwenberg M., 2009. Dynamic psychological games. Journal of Economic 
Theory 114: 1-35 
Battigalli P., Dufwenberg M., 2007. Guilt in games. Americal Economic Review 97: 170-176 
Bacharach M., Guerra G., Zizzo D., 2007. The self-fulfilling property of trust: An 
experimental study. Theory and Decision 63: 349-388  
Becker G., Stigler G., 1974. Law enforcement, malfeasance, and the compensation of 
enforcers. Journal of Legal Studies 3: 1-19 
Binmore, K., Shaked, A., 2010. Experimental economics: Where next? Journal of Economic 
Behavior and Organization 73, 87-100 
Charness G., Dufwenberg M., 2006. Promises and partnership. Econometrica 74: 1579-1601  
Corazzini L., Kube S., Maréchal M., 2007. Towards behavioral public choice: Guilt aversion 
and accountability in the lab. ISLA Working Paper no. 27 
Dufwenberg M., 2002. Marital investments, time consistency and emotions. Journal of 
Economic Behavior and Organization 48: 57-69 
Dufwenberg M., Gächter S., Hennig-Schmidt H., 2006. The framing of games and the 
psychology of strategic choice. CeDEx Discussion Paper no. 2006-20  
Dufwenberg M., Gneezy U., 2000. Measuring beliefs in an experimental lost wallet game. 
Games and Economic Behavior 30: 163-182 
Geanakoplos J., Pearce D., Stacchetti E., 1989. Psychological games and sequential 
rationality. Games and Economic Behavior 1: 60-79 
Guerra, G., Zizzo, D., 2004. Trust responsiveness and beliefs. Journal of Economic Behavior 
and Organization 55: 25-30.  
Huang P., Wu, H., 1994. More order without more law: A theory of social norms and 
organizational cultures. Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 10: 390-406 
Klitgaard R., 1988. Controlling Corruption, University of California Press, Berkeley 
Klitgaard R., 1991. Gifts and bribes. In: Richard Zeckhauser (ed.), Strategy and Choice, MIT 
Press 
Marjit S., Shi H., 1998. On controlling crime with corrupt officials. Journal of Economic 
Behavior and Organization 34: 163-172 
  17Mookherjee D., Png I., 1995. Corruptible law enforcers: How should they be compensated? 
Economic Journal 105: 145-159 
Reuben E., Sapienza P., Zingales L., 2009. Is mistrust self-fulfilling? Economics Letters 104: 
89-91 
Rabin, M., 1993. Incorporating fairness into game theory and economics. American Economic 
Review 83: 1281-1302 
Rose-Ackerman S., 1975. The economics of corruption. Journal of Public Economics 4: 187-
203 
Rose-Ackerman S., 1978. Corruption: A Study of Political Economy, New York: Academic 
Press 
Rose-Ackerman S., 1999. Corruption and government: Causes, consequences, and reform. 
Cambridge University Press 
Shleifer A., Vishny R., 1993. Corruption. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 108: 599-617 
Tirole J., 1996. A theory of collective reputations (with applications to the persistence of 
corruption and to firm quality). Review of Economic Studies 63: 1-22 
van Winden F., 2007. Affective public choice. In: J. C. Pardo and P. Schwartz (eds.), Public 
Choice and the Challenges of Democracy, Edward Elgar 
Varoufakis Y., 2006. The bonds that impede: A model of the joint evolution of corruption and 
apathy. Indian Economic Journal 54: 84-103 
Waller C., Verdier T., Gardner R., 2002. Corruption: Top down or bottom up? Economic 
Inquiry 40: 688-703 
 
  18University of Innsbruck - Working Papers in Economics and Statistics
Recent Papers can be accessed on the following webpage:
http://eeecon.uibk.ac.at/wopec/
2011-10 Stefan Borsky, Paul A. Raschky: A spatial econometric analysis of com-
pliance with an international environmental agreement on open access re-
sources
2011-09 Edgar C. Merkle, Achim Zeileis: Generalized measurement invariance
tests with application to factor analysis
2011-08 Michael Kirchler, J urgen Huber, Thomas St ockl: Thar she bursts -
reducing confusion reduces bubbles modied version forthcoming in
American Economic Review
2011-07 Ernst Fehr, Daniela R utzler, Matthias Sutter: The development of ega-
litarianism, altruism, spite and parochialism in childhood and adolescence
2011-06 Octavio Fern andez-Amador, Martin G achter, Martin Larch, Georg
Peter: Monetary policy and its impact on stock market liquidity: Evidence
from the euro zone
2011-05 Martin G achter, Peter Schwazer, Engelbert Theurl: Entry and exit of
physicians in a two-tiered public/private health care system
2011-04 Loukas Balafoutas, Rudolf Kerschbamer, Matthias Sutter: Distribu-
tional preferences and competitive behavior forthcoming in
Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
2011-03 Francesco Feri, Alessandro Innocenti, Paolo Pin: Psychological pressure
in competitive environments: Evidence from a randomized natural experiment:
Comment
2011-02 Christian Kleiber, Achim Zeileis: Reproducible Econometric Simulations
2011-01 Carolin Strobl, Julia Kopf, Achim Zeileis: A new method for detecting
dierential item functioning in the Rasch model
2010-29 Matthias Sutter, Martin G. Kocher, Daniela R utzler and Stefan
T. Trautmann: Impatience and uncertainty: Experimental decisions predict
adolescents' eld behavior
2010-28 Peter Martinsson, Katarina Nordblom, Daniela R utzler and Matt-
hias Sutter: Social preferences during childhood and the role of gender and
age - An experiment in Austria and Sweden Revised version forthcoming in
Economics Letters2010-27 Francesco Feri and Anita Gantner: Baragining or searching for a better
price? - An experimental study. Revised version accepted for publication in
Games and Economic Behavior
2010-26 Loukas Balafoutas, Martin G. Kocher, Louis Putterman and Matt-
hias Sutter: Equality, equity and incentives: An experiment
2010-25 Jes us Crespo-Cuaresma and Octavio Fern andez Amador: Business
cycle convergence in EMU: A second look at the second moment
2010-24 Lorenz Goette, David Human, Stephan Meier and Matthias Sutter:
Group membership, competition and altruistic versus antisocial punishment:
Evidence from randomly assigned army groups
2010-23 Martin G achter and Engelbert Theurl: Health status convergence at the
local level: Empirical evidence from Austria (revised Version March 2011)
2010-22 Jes us Crespo-Cuaresma and Octavio Fern andez Amador: Buiness
cycle convergence in the EMU: A rst look at the second moment
2010-21 Octavio Fern andez-Amador, Josef Baumgartner and Jes us Crespo-
Cuaresma: Milking the prices: The role of asymmetries in the price trans-
mission mechanism for milk products in Austria
2010-20 Fredrik Carlsson, Haoran He, Peter Martinsson, Ping Qin and Matt-
hias Sutter: Household decision making in rural China: Using experiments
to estimate the inuences of spouses
2010-19 Wolfgang Brunauer, Stefan Lang and Nikolaus Umlauf: Modeling hou-
se prices using multilevel structured additive regression
2010-18 Martin G achter and Engelbert Theurl: Socioeconomic environment and
mortality: A two-level decomposition by sex and cause of death
2010-17 Boris Maciejovsky, Matthias Sutter, David V. Budescu and Patrick
Bernau: Teams make you smarter: Learning and knowledge transfer in auc-
tions and markets by teams and individuals
2010-16 Martin G achter, Peter Schwazer and Engelbert Theurl: Stronger sex
but earlier death: A multi-level socioeconomic analysis of gender dierences in
mortality in Austria
2010-15 Simon Czermak, Francesco Feri, Daniela R utzler and Matthias Sut-
ter: Strategic sophistication of adolescents - Evidence from experimental normal-
form games
2010-14 Matthias Sutter and Daniela R utzler: Gender dierences in competition
emerge early in live2010-13 Matthias Sutter, Francesco Feri, Martin G. Kocher, Peter Martins-
son, Katarina Nordblom and Daniela R utzler: Social preferences in
childhood and adolescence - A large-scale experiment
2010-12 Loukas Balafoutas and Matthias Sutter: Gender, competition and the
eciency of policy interventions
2010-11 Alexander Strasak, Nikolaus Umlauf, Ruth Pfeifer and Stefan Lang:
Comparing penalized splines and fractional polynomials for exible modeling
of the eects of continuous predictor variables
2010-10 Wolfgang A. Brunauer, Sebastian Keiler and Stefan Lang: Trading
strategies and trading prots in experimental asset markets with cumulative
information
2010-09 Thomas St ockl and Michael Kirchler: Trading strategies and trading
prots in experimental asset markets with cumulative information
2010-08 Martin G. Kocher, Marc V. Lenz and Matthias Sutter: Psychological
pressure in competitive environments: Evidence from a randomized natural
experiment: Comment
2010-07 Michael Hanke and Michael Kirchler: Football Championships and Jer-
sey sponsors' stock prices: An empirical investigation
2010-06 Adrian Beck, Rudolf Kerschbamer, Jianying Qiu and Matthias Sut-
ter: Guilt from promise-breaking and trust in markets for expert services -
Theory and experiment
2010-05 Martin G achter, David A. Savage and Benno Torgler: Retaining the
thin blue line: What shapes workers' intentions not to quit the current work
environment
2010-04 Martin G achter, David A. Savage and Benno Torgler: The relationship
between stress, strain and social capital
2010-03 Paul A. Raschky, Reimund Schwarze, Manijeh Schwindt and Fer-
dinand Zahn: Uncertainty of governmental relief and the crowding out of
insurance
2010-02 Matthias Sutter, Simon Czermak and Francesco Feri: Strategic sophi-
stication of individuals and teams in experimental normal-form games
2010-01 Stefan Lang and Nikolaus Umlauf: Applications of multilevel structured
additive regression models to insurance dataUniversity of Innsbruck
Working Papers in Economics and Statistics
2009-01
Loukas Balafoutas
Public beliefs and corruption in a repeated psychological game
Abstract
This paper investigates the role of guilt aversion for corruption in public administra-
tion. Corruption is modeled as the outcome of a game played between a bureaucrat,
a lobby, and the public. There is a moral cost of corruption for the bureaucrat, who
is averse to letting the public down. We study how the behavior of the lobby and the
bureaucrat depend on perceived public beliefs, when these are constant and when
they are allowed to vary over time. With time-varying beliefs, corruption is more
likely when the horizon of the game is relatively long and when public beliefs are
initially low and are updated fast.
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